Discussing Demographic Transitions in Southern Mediterranean Countries by Assistant Professor B Zagaglia & Professor E Moretti




Athens Institute for Education and Research 
ATINER 
 












Polytechnic University of Marche (UNIVPM) 
Italy 
 
Discussing Demographic Transitions in 
Southern Mediterranean Countries 
 



















Athens Institute for Education and Research 
8 Valaoritou Street, Kolonaki, 10671 Athens, Greece 
Tel: + 30 210 3634210 Fax: + 30 210 3634209 
Email: info@atiner.gr URL: www.atiner.gr 
URL Conference Papers Series: www.atiner.gr/papers.htm 
 
Printed in Athens, Greece by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. 
All rights reserved. Reproduction is allowed for non-commercial purposes if the 
















An Introduction to 
ATINER's Conference Paper Series 
 
 
ATINER started to publish this conference papers series in 2012. It includes only the 
papers submitted for publication after they were presented at one of the conferences 
organized by our Institute every year. The papers published in the series have not been 
refereed and are published as they were submitted by the author. The series serves two 
purposes. First, we want to disseminate the information as fast as possible. Second, by 
doing so, the authors can receive comments useful to revise their papers before they 
are considered for publication in one of ATINER's books, following our standard 
procedures of a blind review.  
 
 
Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos 
President 
























This paper should be cited as follows: 
 
Zagaglia, B. and Moretti, E. (2013) "Discussing Demographic Transitions 
in Southern Mediterranean Countries" Athens: ATINER'S Conference 
Paper Series, No: MDT2013-0746. 
   
    
 























In a few decades Mediterranean societies deeply transformed themselves as 
regards many demographic aspects. As in the northern rim but with remarkable 
delay, in the southern rim a lot of countries entered a new regime. This became 
evident in the second part of the last century. 
Demographic literature usually calls the passage from pre-modern to modern 
regime ‘demographic transition’. 
According to some scholars, in Europe and in some other developed countries 
outside Europe the development of the demographic transition has led to enter 
a further new regime known as ‘second demographic transition’. But 
accordance does not exist on a different and new demographic transformation 
and also the presence of a breakdown is disputed.  
Knowledge risen from our past and present research led us to argue about 
different demographic situations in southern Mediterranean countries. Our 
purpose here is to better address the theoretical issue of the demographic 
transitions for the countries of the southern rim of the Mediterranean 
discussing the adherence of theoretical models to empirical evidence. 
Moreover, problems concerning tempo effects and tempo distortions in period 
fertility indicators are considered to asses the real intensities of fertility and, 
consequently, the real state of demographic development. 
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Studying social and demographic dynamics in the Mediterranean Basin, 
various issues emerge that require further insights. Peculiarities raised for five 
major countries of the southern rim - Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Turkey - induced us to discuss and verify the specific characteristics of their 
transitions.  
In this paper, after presenting the main theories on the demographic 
transitions (par. 2) and a synthesis of the results which have come out from the 
analysis we have carried out until now (par. 3), we discuss the adherence of the 
theoretical models to empirical evidence (par. 4).  
 
 
Transition and Transitions 
 
When we talk about demographic transition we refer to the passage from 
an equilibrium of high mortality and fertility to an equilibrium of low mortality 
and fertility, the passage from a pre-modern to a modern demographic regime. 
The theory comes from the observation of the real path made by the crude 
fertility and mortality rates in contemporary history. Forerunners of such a 
theory were, at the beginning of the last century, Warren Thompson and 
Adolphe Landry, while the first definition – even if the term transition was not 
used yet - dates back to Frank Notestein in 1945. Among the scholars that are 
intensively studied Chesnais (1986) must be mentioned, who modelled the 
development of vital rates on the base of regularities found among country-
cases. His book, based on the collection of a long series of historical data all 
over the word can be considered as a reference to understand the different 
types and the different aspects of transitions. Among other, Chesnais identifies 
the beginning and the end of the transition on the base of well defined 
parameters. In particular, according to him it is possible to state the conclusion 
of a transition when the average rate of natural increase lasting returns (for at 
least five years) equal or less than that of the period preceding the date of the 
beginning (a moderately positive or zero natural growth rate). Moreover, 
mortality should have reached a low level if it is ascertained that life 
expectancy at birth for females is at least 73 years. Chesnais sets the ending 
time of the demographic transition in nearly all European countries between 
1960 and 1970, although their starting times are very different. 
The theory supposes that a new balance between vital rates is maintained 
after the transition.  
In the developed world, and in Western Europe in particular, this 
equilibrium was almost immediately disrupted first by the Baby-boom and then 
by the Baby-burst. The long-lasting imbalance and the persistent sub-
replacement fertility have led some scholars to recognize a new demographic 
phase. It is the so-called ‘second demographic transition’, proposed by 
Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa (Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 
1987). Not only this, but the particular low fertility (lowest low) reached by 




some countries in the nineties have led some others even to talk of a ‘third 
demographic transition’ (Kohler, Billari, & Ortega, 2002). 
The second demographic transition (SDT) theory ‘presently, constitutes 
“the” mainstream concept among population scholars dealing with 
demographic change in European societies’ (Billari & Liefbroer, 2004). 
According to Lesthaeghe (2010) and van de Kaa (2004) the second 
demographic transition is not merely the continuation of the first (first 
demographic transition -FDT- is now termed the demographic transition to 
distinguish between the two), not a new stage of it, because the fundamentals 
of the new demographic situation are completely different: contrasting 
nuptiality regimes, contrasts in fertility behaviour, contrasting societal 
background. The main characteristics are the changes in fertility - intensity 
reduction and postponement - made possible by efficient contraception not 
available before, and associated with transformations in familial behaviours. 
The essence of the theory is that such changes in fertility behaviour can be 
traced back and eventually explained by changes in value orientation across 
Western societies. Indeed, individual choice and self-determination, 
particularly of women, replaced the social control on that issue. 
In spite of its popularity, the SDT theory has been subject to criticism. 
According to Coleman (2004) the new trends cannot be considered a new 
transition but a new partial regime change of the FDT. The new regime is 
mainly concerned with a limited and not strictly demographic aspect: marriage 
and its alternative. Moreover, it is based on the same kinds of cultural and 
ideational change forces accounted for the fertility transition in the FDT. 
Individualisation has been a continuous process not different in substance from 
what moved parents to control their offspring during the FDT.  
The new relational forms appear to live together with the traditional form 
of family and not seem to overcome it. The new forms of family constitution 
and re-constitution are not prevalent so that a ‘true’ transition does not exist. 
Instead, it can be stated that in some societies progressive institutions and well-
being permitted a wide spectrum of behaviours. In some other societies, some 
characteristics have spread but they have nothing to do with a well defined 
pattern. 
Cliquet (1991) rejects the thesis of a new transition. Recent trends must be 
considered as an accelerated continuation of the demographic transition. There 
does not exist discontinuity or clear caesura in most of demographic variables. 
Discontinuity, when exists, consists of shifts certainly important but not as 
revolutionary in nature as those produced by the onset of modernization. 
The acceleration of already existing features was caused by an accelerating 
development of already existing and mutually interacting cultural and 
economic processes. 
In line with Cliquet’s view of the modern demographic history is 
Caldwell’s view (2004), which has lengthened the horizon to a grand theory. 
According to Caldwell, the demographic transition theory is an adequate 
theoretical framework to include the more recent demographic developments. 
Modern society and modern demographic behaviours are the product of the 




industrial mode of production. Industrial societies do not need the traditional 
family; they do not need, at the level of individuals or couples, to reproduce.  
The very low fertility regime of the SDT is only the response to the changes 
and the development of industrialization and to the difficulties of societies to 
adequate to them. This mode of production is not overcome yet and there is 
enough room for further development. This means that further, perhaps 
unknown, advancements in demographic behaviour can occur. The 
demographic transition ends with low mortality and fertility, but not 
necessarily with an equilibrium.  
 
 
Demographic Developments in the Major Southern Mediterranean 
Countries 
 
The principal demographic changes the major southern Mediterranean 
countries underwent in recent decades are summarized in Table 1. First 
considering mortality, from an annual average rate of between 19 and 26 per 
thousand in the five-year interval 1950-1955 in Turkey and Morocco 
respectively, the crude death rate (CDR) declined until the current common 
level of 5-6 deaths per every thousand inhabitants. In the same period life 
expectancy at birth increased from between around 42.90 years in Morocco and 
Egypt and 47.59 years in Turkey to between 71.16 years in Morocco and 72.96 
years in Turkey. In particular, today life expectancy at birth for females is 
higher than 73 years in all countries. Thus, the mortality transition had already 
started in the 1950s in Turkey and was moving onto the other countries. Now, 
following Chesnais, it comes to an end in the whole set of countries.  
Compared to mortality, the dynamics of fertility were much more 
multifaceted. Instead, looking jointly at two main fertility indicators, the crude 
birth rate (CBR) and the total fertility rate (TFR), an important decrease in 
fertility occurred with a passage from a situation of homogeneity to one of 
heterogeneity in behaviours among the major southern Mediterranean 
countries. In particular, TFR more than halved, declining from a common 
standard of 6-7 children per woman in the first half of 1950s to the less than 3 
children per woman today, with a range between 2.04 and 2.85. It is 
particularly low in Tunisia and Turkey (2.04 and 2.15 respectively) and quite 
high in Egypt (2.85). These results are quite striking given the resistance of 
fertility to decline in these contexts, a condition shared with the rest of Muslim 
countries. 
As a result of the decline of both the CBR and the CDR, the natural growth 
rate declined too. At present the natural growth rates are positive and still 
relatively high, especially in Egypt. Due to the different time in which fertility 
started to decline, the maximum high growth rate was reached first by Turkey, 
followed by Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. These peaks can be 








From the whole trends of the crude death and birth rates, not presented 
here but analytically discussed in a recent study of ours and to which we refer 
to for details (Zagaglia & Moretti, 2012), it seems that in Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia an equilibrium between the two crude rates has been reached since the 
beginning of the new millennium. In the case of Turkey we observed the 
attainment of an equilibrium too. In Egypt, instead, the distance between the 
two rates reduced slightly and there are no evidence of an equilibrium. 
If we look at the levels of TFR, the intensity fertility indicator that, other 
than changes in reproductive behaviour and the stage of fertility transition, 
highlights the stage of the demographic transition as a whole, the demographic 





Table 1. Principal Demographic Indicators for the Major Southern 
Mediterranean Countries 1950-1955 and 2005-2010 
 Mortality indicators Fertility indicators 
Natural growth rate 










































51 21 7.28 2.38 27.1 15.9 
32.6 
(1970-75) 





50 20 7.18 2.38 24.7 14.3 
30.8 
(1965-70) 



























Note: *In bracket, female life expectancy at birth; **In bracket, five-year interval of maximum. 
Source: Our elaboration on UN data (United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2010 
Revision. CD-ROM Edition, 2011). 
 
Changes in reproductive behaviours, the key variable in the demographic 
transition, were made possible by the spread in the use of contraception 
consisting almost exclusively of reversible female modern methods, except in 
                                                          
1
Classification of the levels of growth by Chesnais (1986). 
2
A TFR of 2.1, corresponding to a zero population growth rate in case of no migration and low 
mortality, is generally considered the threshold to enter the post-transitional phase (Bongaarts, 
2008). 




Turkey where the use of traditional and male methods of contraception is 
particularly high (for details see Zagaglia & Moretti, 2012). 
Even if there is not accordance in literature on the effectiveness of family 
planning programme, implemented by the governments of these countries in 
different times and to different degree (UN, 2010), it is indubitable that a broad 
use of contraception played a role in driving down family size. Moreover, 
contraception has spread at a relatively high speed. To be considered, indeed, 
with respect to this aspect, that Koranic law does not forbid contraception 
(Jones, 2006). 
Islam, instead, encourages the legalization of union formation (Jones, 
2006) and marriage rests the sole allowed form of a stable couple formation. 
However, also important changes happened as regards this aspect: later entry 
and an increasing number of women never entering a union (Zagaglia & 
Moretti, 2012; Tabutin & Schoumaker, 2005; Rashad 2000). 
The issue of union dissolution is difficult to address owing to lack of data. 
According to what is reported in Tabutin & Schoumaker (2005) the divorce 
rate per 100 marriages dropped from 40% (1970 survey) to 19% (1992 survey) 
in Algeria and from 32% in 1941-45 to 14% in 1996-2000 in Egypt, while it 
remained stable at around 15% from the 1960s and the 1980s in Tunisia. 
Changes in union formation and dissolution together with the spread in the 
use of contraception influenced the beginning of reproductive career and the 
intensity and the calendar of fertility. 
Turning to the latter and important aspect, during a fertility transition the 
mean age at childbearing normally declines as birth control first is made within 
the marriage by giving up to further children in function of the number already 
had (i.e. Bongaarts, 1999). The trend of this indicator has followed the classic 
scheme in the cases of Turkey and Egypt until the 1990s while different are the 
schemes for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: increasing as a whole for the first, 
an inverted U-shape curve for the second, and an U-shape curve for the third, 
as shown in Figure 1.  
 




























Source: Our elaboration on UN data (United Nations, World Fertility Data2008. 
(POP/DB/Fert/Rev2008)) 





These shapes are determined by the different changes in fertility schedules 
by age. (Figure 2)  
In Egypt, fertility declined first due to the decrease of fertility at all ages, 
later for the decline especially between the ages of 25 and 39, more recently for 
the decline at young ages. The changes in fertility schedule by age in Turkey 
are similar to the Egyptian ones. Altogether the calendar is set early still today. 
It must be stressed, in the case of Turkey, the particularly high fertility at 
younger ages and a traditional fertility model which persists over time. In both 
cases changes in the timing of fertility have happened only since the 1990s.  
On the contrary, in Algeria changes in the timing of fertility are evident in 
mid-1980s by the postponement of births from young to later ages. From the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, instead, fertility reduced at all ages and from the 
mid-1990s to the mid-2000s especially at young and central ages. 
In Morocco fertility progressively dropped at all ages. Finally, in Tunisia 
fertility changes followed first Morocco then Algeria. 
 








Source: Our elaboration on UN data (United Nations, World Fertility Data2008. 
(POP/DB/Fert/Rev2008)) 
 




The decline of fertility at younger ages as the result of the postponement of 
the beginning of reproductive career causes tempo distortions
1
 in period 
intensity fertility indicators - like TFR - while the decline at older ages does not 
if decline regards family size and not calendar (Bongaarts, 1999). Thus, in the 
three countries of Maghreb tempo distortions could have operated at least since 
the 1970s. For Egypt and Turkey, tempo distortions look operating in the most 
recent period even if they might have been at work for a longer time period. 
Confirmation of that could be obtained by an investigation of fertility by birth 
order. Unfortunately, births by order or age-order-specific fertility indicators 
are not available. However, for shorter periods and except for Algeria, we are 
able to investigate the changes in the median age at first birth for women
2
.  
The results confirm childbearing postponement for the years for which 
data are available. The annual average change in the median age at first birth 
by age of the mother was always positive with very few exceptions and 
increases were often higher than 0.10. Postponement was stronger for Turkey 
(period 1993-2003) and above all for Morocco (since the late 1970s) and 
Tunisia (period 1978-1988) than for Egypt (whole period 1978-2005). In 
particular, it is strong in Morocco since the1980s. (Table 2) 
In conclusion, in these countries fertility decline as measured by period 
TFR is likely overestimated. The main period measure of fertility does not 
adequately represent current and recent fertility conditions in the populations. 
 
Table 2. Annual average change in female median age at first birth   
 Median age at birth of first child 
 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
      Egypt             1978-1988 0,12+ 0,16+ 0,05   
1988-1995 0,04 -0,03 0,11+ 0,21 0,04 
1995-2005 0,08 0,10+ 0,07 0,05 0,20 
      Turkey           1983-1993 0,14+ 0,00 -0,02   
                      1993-2003 0,11+ 0,13+ 0,13+ 0,02 0,05 
      Morocco        1977-1987 0,14+ 0,12+ 0,10   
1987-1995  0,25+ 0,19+ 0,16+ 0,04 
      1995-2003/4  0,25+ 0,20+ 0,13+ 0,14+ 
      Tunisia          1978-1988 0,20+ 0,17+ 0,01   
Note: + indicates changes greater than  0,10 





Finally, we want to give answer to the following research question: in the 
five countries analyzed are we in front of two different transitions - first and 
                                                          
1
A “tempo distortion” is a tempo effect in period demographic measures not reflecting current 
conditions. It is the case when age-specific rates shift to higher or lower ages. See Bongaarts & 
Feeney for details (2010).  
2
We use data from DHS surveys but in Algeria only one survey was carried on.  




second - or two subsequent stages of the same transition? Or have we directly 
to consider one and only path developing in a single phase by anticipating 
some characteristics typical of the SDT on the fertility side? 
The answer is not the same for the five countries and also those countries 
showing the most similar paths exhibit significant differences and peculiarities. 
Egypt and Turkey are the countries that seem better to be included in the 
interpretative scheme of a first transition possibly followed by a second 
transition, or better a second phase. We talk about a possibility because 
according to the Chesnais’ methodology the first transition is concluded as 
regards mortality but not concluded as regards fertility. Fertility transition is in 
its final phase in Turkey but it is late phase in Egypt. However, in Egypt it 
seems that some conditions typical of the European SDT are present: a 
considerable spread of modern contraception and an evident postponement of 
the timing of fertility. Instead, in Turkey, where the end of the transition is 
close to an end, these conditions are not present except a recent change in the 
calendar of fertility. Reproductive behaviour in this country is particularly 
close to the traditional model. 
On the contrary, the three countries of Maghreb seem better to be included 
in the theoretical scheme of a single evolutive model embodying the models of 
both the first and the second transition. 
In these countries the decline of fertility encountered resistance but when it 
started it deployed by the most salient features of the SDT. This is particularly 
true for Algeria, the last country among the five countries considered to have 
entered the fertility transition and which began the process by a more and more 
postponed reproductive model. It is not too hard to conclude that in Algeria 
mortality has declined according to the scheme of the first transition while 
fertility has declined according to the scheme of the second one. However, the 
progress in transition is late as a whole.  
In Tunisia, both the mortality and the fertility transition started earlier and 
seem nearly concluded. As regards fertility, it appears first to have the 
characteristics of the first then of the second transition. 
Nevertheless, at least for these three countries the whole transitional 
process and its most recent phase should be reconsidered as the fertility decline 
was certainly overestimated.  
Also for Turkey and Egypt the current level of fertility at least should be 
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